



HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
IRANIAN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

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NARRATOR: Stewart Rockwell

DATE OF INTERVIEW: May 20, 1987

PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Cambridge, MA

INTERVIEWER: Habib Ladjevardi

Tape No.: 1

RESTRICTIONS: None

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Narrator: Stuart Rockwell

Date: May 20, 1987

Place: Cambridge, MA

Interviewer: Habib Ladjevardi

Tape no.: 1

Q. Mr. Ambassador, if I could begin this session by asking you to describe the extent and nature of your familiarity with and knowledge of Iran before you actually arrived there as Minister, I believe, in 1960.

A. Yes, I was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1956 until 1960 with particular responsibility for Greece, Turkey and Iran and Cypress, so I had a general knowledge of our relationship with Iran during that period although I had never been there. In late 1959, I was informed that I was to be made Minister at Tehran and I therefore took a brief course in the Persian language and departed for Iran in March of 1960, where I remained until the summer of 1965 as Minister in our Embassy. I considered it one of the most interesting and enjoyable tours of diplomatic duty that I had during my entire career for several reasons. First, the challenging and interesting nature of our relationship with Iran; secondly, the nature of the Iranian people whom we met during our stay in Tehran, some of whom remain our closest friends that we made among the representatives and citizens of the countries in which we served during

my career; and thirdly because Iran itself is a fascinating country full of historical interest and natural beauty. Of course the main preoccupation during my assignment to Tehran was our relationship with that country and notably because of the political system in Iran, our relationship with the Shah himself. It was not an easy relationship. Not because our basic interest did not seem to be the same, but because of the personality and the policies of the Shah himself. Also a problem was the attitude of segments of the American people and to a certain extent of the administration of President Kennedy toward the Iranian problem as seen in this country notably what was perceived as an increasingly authoritarian regime denying to the Iranian people the possibility of a democratic participation in the political system of the country. This combination of currents and political pressures made it sometimes difficult for the U.S. Embassy to maintain the kind of relationship with the Iranian Government and with the Shah which would have resulted in a smooth and uncomplicated day to day relationship. On the whole however, it seemed to me that as far as that relationship was concerned that during those years from 1960 to 1965, that the outlook and the general characteristic of that relationship was positive. The Shah saw in the United States a powerful friend which shared his general outlook toward the region notably that there was a joint desire for stability, there was concern over the motives and methods of the Soviet Union, there was concern over the effects of radical Arab nationalism as headed up by Colonel Nasser in Cairo, and there was a belief, I think, shared by both parties increasingly as the end of that period approached that Iran was, under the Shah, was in an increasingly good position to exercise a moderating and stabilizing influence on the region. The U.S. regarded the Shah as a desirable political asset, there's no doubt about that. He shared, as I said, or seemed to share, some of the major purposes that formed the basis of our policy toward the area, and he regarded, the Shah regarded us as a distant yet usefully powerful friend who did

Stuart Rockwell - 1

not have, territorial or political designs upon this country contrary to the Soviet Union. At the same time the Shah was quick to resent any apparent effort by the United States to interfere in what he regarded as his personal domain of the Iranian political situation. And this was the major cause of problems for the Embassy during that period notably the pressure from the United States both through the media and private groups and particularly during the Kennedy Administration from the Government itself to convey to the Shah the message that the United States felt that his regime and the welfare of the country would be greatly strengthened if it were possible to gradually alter the autocratic and one man nature of Iranian rule in the direction of a greater participation by the Iranian people in the political process of governing notably through the development of what was called a bridgehead toward the middle class. Iranian society at that time was largely composed of a miniscule elite at the top and a large and apolitical majority of peasant farmers many of whom were illiterate and a small but growing middle class concentrated in the large cities and comprising a number of politically active and knowledgeable intellectuals. It was this latter segment that Washington felt could be used and should be used to develop the growth and democracy in Iran always under the leadership of the Shah. It was precisely this outlook on the part of private and public American interest that caused the Shah to be suspicious that the Embassy was not as thoroughly committed to his own way of seeing things in Iran as he would like it to be. And it caused trouble for the Embassy in its efforts although I must confess they were not extensive because they were under we were under certain amount of constraint with regard to dealing with the opposition. Such efforts as we did make to maintain contact with them rapidly became known to the Shah and caused him on more than one occasion to complain in Washington that the Embassy was undermining his authority.

Q. Do you recall the incident?

A. This was particularly notable in the case of our connections with Dr. Ali Amini who was an Iranian politician in my view with a broader view than most of them had and a more courageous attitude toward solving the problems especially in the political field of his country. We did not have with him any contacts that would be considered in any normal situation as subversive or as seeking to undermine the authority of the Shah. We had paid no secret to the fact however that we regarded him as one of the more positive elements on the Iranian political scene. And he was cordially received at the Embassy, and we were, I guess, pleased when the Shah chose him to be Prime Minister. However, there is no doubt we had problems with Dr. Amini when he became Prime Minister. He felt at one time that we were not living up to the commitments we made with respect to financial assistance. But in any event that kind of a situation was typical of the difficulty of dealing with the Shah, particularly as he grew more and more certain of himself and unwilling to listen to anything which could be considered to be criticism of his conduct of the political situation in Iran. At the same time there grew, there was a growing cooperation between the United States and Iran in the military field. This was coincident with the enormous growth in the Iranian income from the exploitation of Iranian oil. The Shah welcomed this growth in revenue which he proceeded to use not only in connection with the purposes of the "Enghelab-e Sefid" or "white revolution" but also to strengthen the military establishment to the point where by the end of 1965 he was by far Iran was by far the most powerful military force in the Gulf. And Iranian military force had been used not only to take over the Islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb but also to send a force to support the Sultan of Oman in suppressing the revolution in Dhofar. This increase and use of, this strengthening of Iran in the Military field was seen as a positive

development by the United States; however, concomitantly there was a real concern that the Shah was going too fast, that he was devoting too much of Iranian revenue to the purchase of sophisticated equipment which could not be absorbed or might not be likely to be absorbed by the relatively unsophisticated Iranian military establishment, and also that the use of so much revenue for military purposes was depriving the Iranian nation of much needed injection of funds for other needed social and economic developments such as health services, irrigation, the building of roads, whatever. This is not to say that the Shah was not spending a good deal of money on those purposes and during the time that I was there, there were tremendous advances in the economic infrastructure of the country. The indirect results of the white revolution brought prosperity on an unheard of scale to many many Iranians who never had any money to speak of. And so you found the streets of Tehran becoming choked with private automobiles, enormous traffic jams, people were not happy unless they had a refrigerator, a clothes dryer, a large numbers of new apartment buildings went up in Tehran and so the increased prosperity of Iran was being spread about to the point where it created a number of rising expectations among the citizens which rose to the point where they could not be satisfied. However, that's another story and the results of that dissatisfaction only became apparent much later. And during the time that I was there of which I am speaking, Iran seemed to be surging forward. The political complaints which had been quite vociferous when I first arrived became muted as people, especially people who had exiled themselves for political reasons began to see that there was opportunity for them at home and many of the most vociferous critics of the Shah turned up back in Tehran and were given well paying and meaningful jobs in the Administration. Naturally their political complaints ceased immediately and they became apparently at least on the surface some of the Shah's strongest supporters. All of this was rather ironic we felt. But it is typical of the times which were good

or seemed to be good to those of us who were there and who were dedicated to our friendship with Iran and had full hope that although the Shah was an autocrat and was increasingly difficult to deal with as he became more and more powerful and things seemed to be going better and better. But nonetheless, the outcome at the end would be good for the average Iranian and for the United States, whose interest in the prosperity and stability of Iran was great, particularly in view of the negative developments that were occurring at the same time in the area. I speak of the Arab-Israel problem, the invasion of Cypress, the difficulties in Pakistan with India. Iran seemed to be emerging as an island of stability a thing which the Shah of course was quick to point out to everybody as reason for our continuing support in fact or increasing it. The Shah of course saw himself as the benefactor of his country. He often said that he intended to bring Iran to the level of a Western European country before he turned his reign over to his son. Insofar as his dealings with the political situation in Iran were concerned, he felt that Iranians were an undisciplined, unsophisticated and uneducated people as far as politics were concerned and the only way to bring them to a degree of mature political activity was by a general and gradual process of education under the beneficial and beneficent tutelage of an intelligent and dedicated sovereign. In furtherance of this idea, he interfered quite regularly in the political process notably by seeking to control the elections to the Majles and by dissolving the Majles if it did not behave as he thought it should. He said that one of the problems he had with the Majles was that despite his efforts to make sure that enlightened and positive thinking people were elected that it always seemed to happen that the Majles had too many fanatic right wing landowners who resisted reforms, the reforms that he had in mind bringing about under the aegis of the white revolution, notably land reform, or that it was represented, it had too large a representation of dedicated left wing irrational and almost fanatic people who wished Iran to move much faster toward a fully participatory democracy that

he the Shah felt it was possible for it to do given the lack of political education and the lack of discipline which he felt the Iranian people showed. This obviously, this situation presented a constant possibility of clash between the throne and the domestic political elements and ... that during the time that I was there anyway there was really no meaningful progress toward a truly democratic development in the country. Although a casual observer I think particularly looking at the situation in the surrounding Arab states and the Soviet Union would have been rather impressed by the degree of political opposition that was expressed by the Iranians without fear of reprisal of any kind, and in the press. However, there is no doubt that anybody who was considered as being seriously involved in opposition to the regime, particularly if it was clandestine was apt to get in serious and very painful trouble. And this was one of the real reasons that so much trouble occurred later because of the security forces which became increasingly violent and outrageous in their treatment of people who often, in at least a Westerners view could be considered to be nothing more dangerous than a dedicated liberal. At the time that I was there, these incidents though they did occur, were not so numerous as to provoke widespread discontent and people knew that if they minded their own business and did not seek to undermine the authority of the Shah that they could prosper and lead useful and untroubled lives. So on the whole and speaking only from the point of view of a foreign observer and an American official who was interested in the maintenance of good relations between Iran and the United States. The period 1960-1965 was very good from our point of view, and we thought from the point of view of Iran as a whole. Never being unaware of the fact that there were Iranians who did not agree and that the Shah had many weaknesses as a ruler. Nonetheless, I think we felt that his positive characteristics outweighed the negative ones, and that if he were to be permitted to continue his policies as he set them forth, that the end result would be a strengthened Iran and probably one

where the Shah would have set into motion the forces that he could not control in the sense of the development of democracy. And one has to admit I think that the Shah took a number of courageous steps that were most unusual in a Middle Eastern country. One was land reform. He made, deliberately made enemies of some of the most powerful political figures in the country by depriving them of the basis of their wealth i.e. their villages which in some cases were thirty miles square in territory, and by the establishment of the literacy core where he deliberately began a process where the illiterate majority of Iran became educated and could read and could express opinions and read more about politics by reading the papers than they ever had, all of which could lead to a greater participation of the people in the political process not necessarily always in favor of the throne. So I think it is one of the most poignant aspects of the Iranian tragedy that the Shah who, whatever may have been his weaknesses, was considered by us to have the best interest of Iran in mind and to be rather far-sighted and courageous in undertaking what he considered to be reforms although reforms under the control of the throne that the things that he was trying to do were not at the time appreciated by many Iranian intellectuals who resented his control as appreciated as they might have been especially in retrospect now that one sees the current situation in that country.

Q. One of the things that I was wondering about is when someone of your stature or even someone less senior gets assigned to Iran in a political post, how much of an opportunity does he have to really go over the correspondence or reports of previous officials in Iran. How far back would he normally go, for instance when you went over in 1960 were you familiar with the reports that had been written in the late 40's by George Allen and by Ambassador Henderson about especially about the way they viewed the Shah's mode of government and behavior and assets and liabilities and so on? How much of what had happened before did the person

going to Iran take with them? How much did he have to discover on his own, re-invent the wheel if I may?

A. Well of course I had been in the State Department for four years before I went there so I was aware of the reporting from Tehran during that period and anybody who is going to a country like that would obviously want to read up, both in the official files and data and private writers concerning the country so I think that the general outline of the Shah's attitude and of our problems with him and of the developments in the country were quite well known. The history of our relationship with the Shah depended a great deal on the Shah's personality and it went back from the change that occurred when he first ascended the throne as an inexperienced, and moody and insecure young man to his gradual development, particularly as his country became wealthier and more influential into a chief of state of supreme self-confidence and arrogant disregard for the views of other people. So the Shah's general policy and our general problems with him were quite well known to those of us who before one would have gone out there. And they did not change really basically. It was a one man situation and one had to deal with the one man, because there was nothing else really. He had managed to make certain that there were no rivals to authority. Prime Minister's were coming and going as he saw fit to have them do. They did not have an independent power with the exception of course of Mohammad Mossadegh, a tumultuous period and one of extreme difficulty for the Shah but that was long before I got there.

Q. You were talking about the stress that the Shah put on Military power, Military force as opposed to other aspects of life such as education and so on. And I was struck by a quotation by President Eisenhower. This is dated 14 December 1959. I believe this is the statement he made while he was visiting Iran for a half a day. The press report said Eisenhower said freedom could be lost if "basic aspirations of

humanity were not served." And then he also said that military strength alone couldn't insure security. This is sort of a surprising thing for a President, General Eisenhower to say to the Shah of Iran because one sort of expected that these kind of statements would have been made during the Kennedy administration and not the last days of Eisenhower. Do you happen to remember the circumstances for Eisenhower making such a dramatic statement?

A. No, I do not remember the specific circumstances but there was a continuing concern in Washington that Iran that the Iranian regime was too autocratic and did not provide the basis for a wider participation by the political elements in the process of governing. And I would think that such a statement by the President could of course also be considered to refer to the Soviet Union. But also might have been thought to be useful in prodding the Shah to make some move in the direction of building a more democratic political structure.

Q. But looking back did this surprise you that even the time of Eisenhower administration this concern was at a level that the President himself would have made such a statement?

A. I don't think that it is surprising that the concern existed because the situation in Iran was well known. I would say however that not much more was done than to make a statement at that time. It wasn't until the arrival of the Kennedy Administration that more specific efforts were made to persuade the Shah to do something about broadening the base of his regime.

Q. Where did that idea, when you said Washington was prodding us to do this or that with the Shah, what individuals in fact were really in Washington concerned with these questions that were formulating in the

Stuart Rockwell - 1

A. Well, I think probably one of the more active one's was Philip Talbot who was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs at that time. And who became anathema to the Shah who considered him to be one of the irritants in our relationship. I remember once hearing the Shah say that somebody had been made Ambassador to Greece, and the Shah said, "Oh the poor Greeks, what have they done."

Q. Had they actually come in contact?

A. Oh yes, yes.

Q. Mr. Talbot and the Shah?

A. Mr. Talbot made several visits to Iran.

Q. It is also been written that the Shah was very unhappy with the Kennedy Administration and that he even said that when the President was assassinated a sigh of relief was given to Tehran. Is that, does that fit with your recollections of the Shah's view of Kennedy or is that an exaggeration?

A. No I think the Shah considered Kennedy to be an uninformed meddler in Iranian affairs and I'm sure that there was no visible or noticeable favorable reaction to his assassination. Nothing was so unseemly would have been done. But I'm sure that the Shah was not unhappy that he to think that he might any longer be the object of the Administration's concern about the way he handled the affairs of State. The Kennedy Administration came into office on its one of its basis, political basis, for foreign affairs was its version of human rights and favoring democracy ... not just in Iran. But Iran was one of the, you know for years people said the Shah was sitting on a volcano and that if something were not done he would be overthrown and there would be an explosion. They kept saying that year after year but meanwhile in Iran itself and especially after the white revolution, things

seemed to be going in just the opposite direction. And I remember thinking that of course if you say there is going to be a revolution and you say it every year for fifty years maybe at the end of fifty years there will be one. But in the case of Iran, the constant complaints from liberal circles in the United States seemed to lose their force as nothing really alarming occurred in Iran with the exception of the Khomeini inspired disturbances in 1963.

Q. was the U.S. influence into the content of the white revolution. Someone I once interviewed told me that the whole White Revolution, especially the land reform part of it, was cooked up in the basement of the White House by Robert Komer, but I was never able to substantiate this.

A. I don't think there's any truth whatsoever to that. Obviously the U.S. had been aware that the land tenure situation in Iran was a medieval anachronism but didn't take it much to see that. The United States did not have any program for Iran other than the general and gradual bringing of a greater segment of the population into the day to day political operations of the government and we certainly did not have any blueprint for the White Revolution. But the problems addressed by the revolution were ones that were crying for solution; the lack of education, the need for greater medical services, the need for the distribution of land. I don't know where the idea of profit sharing in the factories came from. It was certainly not something that we thought sounded very logical. However, I can assure you to the best of my knowledge we had nothing to do with the proposing of the six points of the White Revolution. The national ownerships of forests

Q. What were the opportunities actually and the nature of influencing the Shah toward particular policies: ... spending less on military or what form did that influence take and where did it take place? Was it mainly on his visits to Washington and discussions with the President? Or was it through the Ambassador

in Tehran? If you could just give a few examples. What words would be used and what was the general tenor of the suggestions?

A. Well, our relations with Iran were in three general fields: in political field, the economic field and the military field. And in the economic field and military fields we had joint committees established, Iranian and American committees, for the discussion of Iran's needs and desires in these fields. And the idea particularly in the military field was that there would be a limit to what Iran would acquire or would be permitted to acquire in the United States, depending on the judgment of the committee as to whether the material could be absorbed and whether it was suitable for use in Iran. There was also a cooperative committee for the evaluation of the use of Iranian resources derived from the oil. And it was through these committees that an input of American influence was injected into the fields of Iranian endeavor, because obviously the U.S. did not have to permit the sale or the granting of military equipment to Iran in particular fields. And it was notable that we resisted the Shah's desire for rapid and dramatic expansion of the Air Force, particularly in the acquisition of some of these tremendously expensive and very complicated fighter airplanes. At the end long after I had left, Iran did end up getting some of them, and they're the ones that fell into the hands of the Khomeini regime. On the political side the major opportunities for influence were in the regular meetings between the Ambassador and the Shah.

Q. How regular were they?

A. Well, depending on the Ambassador and the Shah, the feelings of the Shah at the time, they might occur once a month, or as often as once every two weeks, or as infrequently as once every three months. During the time when the Shah was riding so high, he did not offer much of an opportunity for Ambassadorial influence because he didn't feel that he had problems which needed any input from

foreign officials, and because he became increasingly resentful of what he considered to be U.S. interference in Iran's domestic political affairs. During the period that I was there, the Shah did not welcome advice from an American Ambassador. In the early days when he was insecure he seemed practically to regard the American and British Ambassadors as paternal advisors.

Q. This is in the 50's?

A. Yes. And in the later days when he was so ill and losing control, he turned almost pathetically toward them for suggestions as to what should be done. But during the intervening period when he was riding high he thought he knew best and certainly did not encourage or act favorably upon foreign advice. So my answer to you is that the opportunity for influencing the Shah were not all that numerous during the time that I was there. And a lot depended on the Ambassadors I have to say that one or two of our Ambassadors were afraid of the Shah, who was very impressive let nobody mistake that. He knew the oil business backwards and forward. He had a commanding personality when he was full of self-confidence, he was arrogant, he was very much the king of kings, and he was very difficult to deal with, and one of our Ambassadors Edward Wales was particularly, unvigorous in dealing with the Shah, I think partly because the Shah intimidated him.

Q. During your time who were the Ambassadors under whom you served?

A. Edward Wales, Julius Holms and Armin Meyer.

Q. Could it also be that because he had established relationships with U.S. Presidents that he sort of felt that the U.S. Ambassador was not at a level which he could deal somebody who's a subordinate rather than...

A. Yes, that was true to an extent and particularly he did not hesitate to complain if the subordinates of the Ambassador were infringing his implicit sensitivity about

dealing with so called opposition elements. But he would have his embassy in Washington complain to the State Department about people, individuals. He also had a very close relationship with the CIA agent in Tehran. And often I think he thought that he could use that channel to countermand the a situation prevailing in the relationship with the State Department.

Q. How close was the exchange of information between the Embassy and the CIA at the time? How much did the left hand know what the right hand was doing?

A. Well, in the early days of my period there, I had the feeling that the CIA Station Chief did not was not fully frank in his dealings with the Ambassador, but he maintained a relationship with the Shah so-called in the intelligence field which could well have been broader than just pure intelligence. That is just a feeling. I can't answer your question.

Q. If I remember correctly, during the Kennedy Administration, some sort of directive was given that the CIA was to be subordinate to the Ambassador. Is that true?

A. Well, I think it was, the Ambassador is the President's representative and the instructions have always been that the Ambassador is the paramount U.S. official in a country and that he has the need and the right to be informed of whatever representatives of other agencies are doing. As I recall this directive which always existed, was strengthened under the Kennedy Administration. But since the CIA had its own communication, one could never be sure.

Q. Was this effective? Did this directive have any tangible effect in Tehran as far as you could see?

A. Well, as far as I could see, everything was fine, but I'm not certain that it was.

Q. Did you know how often he had an audience with the Shah? Was that known to you people?

A. Well, no we did know that but exactly what happened we never were certain of.

Q. Was he required to come and give you a report?

A. Yes that was the idea. He was supposed to come and he did come. Of course I wasn't the Ambassador then, at any of those times, so I don't really know what went on between the two of them.

Q. I see, so he would give it directly to the Ambassador.

A. If the Ambassador chose to tell me he would, but only when I was charge would he come directly to me. But that's a situation that prevails always all over the world when you have another agency that has its own communications. So much depends on the relationship between the representatives.

Q. How important was the military channel? Could that be used in the same way by the Shah?

A. No, not really.

Q. Military assistance

A. In Washington the situation was that of control and cooperation between the State Department and the Pentagon was much more effective at making sure there was a unanimity of views. No, there was no real problem with the Military.

Q. How knowledgeable was the Embassy about the assistance in training that the CIA was giving to SAVAK?

A. Well, all we knew was that they were being sent to the States for training. Just exactly what kind of training they got we didn't know. I'm not sure that we inquired either.

Q. If I could go through the various Prime Ministers that were in charge just prior to your going to Iran and during the time you were there. I'm not sure if Eghbal was still Prime Minister or if had just been replaced.

A. No, he was still there.

Q. Do you remember anything in particular about Dr. Eghbal and the change of Sharif-Emami? Was there anything memorable about it.

A. No, I don't recall anything. I have to say that I don't recall very much about any of the Iranian Prime Ministers except Amini, Hoveida and Mansour.

Q. I know I asked you this last night, but I didn't have a tape recorder then. Could you describe what you remember about the appointment of Amini and give a response to this question of U.S. influence in the selection of Amini. It was said that while Amini was in Washington he'd made many friends and he'd even become a friend of Senator Kennedy and so on and therefore the Shah said in his interviews and in his books that the Americans forced him to appoint Amini.

A. Well, Amini is still alive as far as I know. I regarded him as one of the most interesting and admirable Iranian politicians in the sense that he seemed to be dedicated Iranian in the sense that he had the interest in his country at heart. And yet he was courageous enough to understand the weaknesses of the situation and to try to correct them. He was an intelligent, dedicated, patriotic politician. He had many good American friends which he made when he was Ambassador here. And he was more forward looking. He was what we would call here a liberal in the Iranian sense there. Although he was of the elite and was wealthy and one of the first families of Iran. He was not limited in his views and so conservative as to be impervious to change. His problem was that just because of all that he was suspected of not being sufficiently loyal to the throne and his connections with

Stuart Rockwell - 1

farmers and particularly Americans caused the Shah to be suspicious of him. He was appointed Prime Minister because at the time the Shah apparently concluded that it would please the United States.

Q. Why was that particular time important for the Shah to please the United States?

A. Well, there were some serious economic problems facing the country at that time, this is before the revenue started to come in and Amini was an economist and had various views as to how these should be solved. And it is possible also that the Shah felt that the appointment of Amini as Prime Minister might cause the United States to be more generous in providing economic assistance. In any event he appointed him but I can assure you to the best of my knowledge we had no overt influence. We didn't suggest to the Shah that he do so. It could be that the Shah thought that we would like it, and I guess we did like it, because we thought Amini was a good man but we did not take it upon ourselves to tell the Shah that we thought he should appoint him.

Q. Now it seems in retrospect that Amini didn't really, that Amini could have received more support from the United States.

A. Well, that's true and I think Amini made a bitter statement as I recall and accusing us of not living up to our commitments as far as aid is concerned. A statement which I think he later retracted as I recall but or at least apologized for. The fact remains that almost every Iranian political thought that the solution to Iran's problems was more American assistance. As time went on, the willingness of Washington to provide that assistance and in Congress began to become less and less and we did not agree with the idea that the panacea for Iran was more American dollars. We felt that there were other things that should be done -- reforms of the economic systems -- all the various things that economists have in mind for this sound economy. Some of which were very difficult to take or couldn't

be taken because the infrastructure for carrying them out didn't exist in Iran. But it's perfectly true that Amini didn't, his appointment didn't result in substantially increased American aid. Although it could well have prevented a further decrease because it was felt that his appointment was a constructive thing and that he himself was a constructive element.

Q. One of the first events of his ... the Premiership was that several of the top military officers including General Kia who was head of Military Intelligence and I believe General Bakhtiar who was head of SAVAK were dismissed. Do you have any recollections about that event or the circumstances or reactions were at the time?

A. No. I do not.

Q. Among the many political rulers that still seem to persist among Iranians is that a reason why Bakhtiar was dismissed was because during a trip that he had made to the United States apparently a year or a few months before his dismissal, he had made some overtures to some officials, possibly the CIA, about his own future and his own possibilities, perhaps taking on a stronger position in Iran, possible becoming ruler or something like that and the word had sort of been leaked to the Shah and that's why he dismissed him. Can you shed any light on this?

A. Well, I never heard about anything Bakhtiar did in the U.S., but it seems to me, my recollection is that there was evidence that he was plotting against the Shah. In fact didn't he flee to Iraq?

Q. Yes, this is afterwards.

A. I don't recall anything about anything he is said to have said in the United States. Certainly it would not have been our policy to support Bakhtiar against the

Stuart Rockwell - 1

Shah. I never really did know what he was supposed to have been doing and whom he was dealing with. It was after I left I guess that all this happened.

Q. A few years before that, when you were still in Washington, there was a sort of an attempted by General Gharani.

A. Yes, I remember that.

Q. That had something to do with Dr. Amini. Do you recall anything about that?

A. No, I do remember hearing about it but nothing occurred while I was there about that, but that was in the background. Bakhtiar was assassinated by SAVAK wasn't he?

Q. Yes, late 60's early 70's.

A. They caught him.....(tape ends)



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TAPE No. 2

RESTRICTIONS: None

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Narrator: Stuart Rockwell

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Tape no.: 2

Q. What do you remember about the crackdown against the National Front. Apparently, early, I believe, in Amini's time or apparently when Sharif-Emami was Prime Minister, the National Front had been given a new life almost comparable to what happened in 1978, before the Revolution, where they had a large rally in Tehran, and they were going to participate in elections perhaps. There was a crack down and I believe after a demonstration at Tehran University and most of the top leaders of the National Front were put in jail. Do you remember that event? Or do you remember any kind of reaction that you people had at the Embassy or among yourselves or even discussions that you may have had with the Shah about that?

A. I don't remember any discussions with the Shah, I remember that the event occurred. I remember that the National Front was not regarded by the Embassy as a serious political force at the time. I'm not sure that that was correct. It seemed to be nearly a shadow of its former self for understandable reasons because it had been ruled against but we didn't consider the National Front or its remnants to be of any particular significance. And we did not say anything to the Shah about the arrest of

Stuart Rockwell - 2

them as far as I know. And as I recall it, the rest of the people were subsequently released. So I guess we didn't think it was a major event.

Q. I guess at the same time your saying that you would not have involved yourself in this kind of domestic political affair.

A. No. Of course, there really was a prohibition against dealing with the National Front within the Embassy.

Q. When did that start?

A. That had started some time back. I believe you have talked to Bill Miller.

Q. Yes I did.

A. He of course had strong views about dealing with the National Front. But it was Embassy policy that the contacts with the National Front had to be extremely discreet because of the problem it caused with the Shah, who inevitably found out if they were not discreet. So I'm pretty sure that nobody said anything to the Shah about the arrest of the National Front.

Q. Do you recall the preparations and actual visits of the Shah in April 1962 to Washington, the first time he was meeting the President and Mrs. Kennedy. What do you recall about the circumstances of that visit and the significance of its outcome and so on?

A. Well I can't say that I recall other than it was apparently quite successful. As I remember, the Shah was not married at that time I guess was he?

Q. Yes he was.

A. In any event, it was a very glittering reception at the White House. I remember pictures of Mrs. Kennedy and the President and the Shah and I guess it was the Empress.

Stuart Rockwell - 2

Q. Were you in Tehran at the time?

A. I was in Tehran.

Q. And who accompanied the Shah?

A. The Ambassador went back. Julius Holms I believe. As I remember, it was considered to be a very successful visit.

Q. Taking the Shah's suspicions and feelings about the Kennedy Administration, it seems that this face to face meeting would have been something which would have been considered very important.

A. You might have thought that. I don't recall that anything dramatic had occurred. These instructions that we got about talking to the Iranians to the Shah occurred before the Shah came to Washington. I don't remember what was said between the Shah and the President. But I don't remember that the Shah was displeased.

Q. Basically, how much of what went on in Washington did the Tehran Embassy know? Did it know anything that was important or would there be some things that were just kept ...

A. Well it would depend on what was sent to the Embassy by the State Department. The idea being that normally any conversations between the two heads of State, if the State Department were privy to them as it usually was, copies would be sent to Tehran.

Q. Because it seems in fact that a few months after the Shah returned a general political crackdown, you could say, against the opposition took place. Amini was forced to resign. Seeing it from the Iranian point of view, the Shah had met President Kennedy and had come to some sort of an understanding that he is the one who would be supported and that he would, henceforth, have a freer hand in conducting domestic affairs in Iran--as he saw fit. And it is interesting to go back

Stuart Rockwell - 2

and look at those events because one has the impression that while President Kennedy was in office, the whole period would be characterized by some sort of a pressure on the Shah to liberalize and so on, while in fact it was while Kennedy was still alive and was President that a mini-crackdown began.

A. I can't help you much there. I don't recall any particular reason that the Shah would have had to think that he had a green light from Kennedy to do as he saw fit. The chronology would seem to indicate that the Shah felt that there would not be an adverse, but I honestly don't remember anything particularly significant about that visit.

Q. Do you remember any connection between that visit and Amini's resignation?

A. No.

Q. What do you remember, if anything, about the days or weeks before Amini actually resigned. Was this something that was seen immanent, his resignation? Was there any desire or effort to try to reconcile the Shah and Amini and keep Amini who you saw as a hopeful figure in power?

A. I don't remember any intervention by the Embassy. It just seemed, as I recall it, that the relationship between the two men got increasingly bad and that the Shahs' suspicions that he always harbored became strengthened that Amini was disloyal. But what the actual reasons and circumstances were I don't recall.

Q.. Do you remember anything about the arrest and imprisonment of Ebtehaj?

A. Ebtehaj was an interesting man. He had no concern about anything he said and it landed him in jail on several occasions. He was very extreme in his criticism of the Shah. I've forgotten what it was that caused him to be arrested this time but he certainly was arrested, but he wasn't the kind of person who was plotting against

Stuart Rockwell - 2

the Shah. He was merely not afraid to speak out in public and he certainly did so particularly abroad..

Q.

A. Yes that seems to be what led to his arrest that he was critical of the regime, and particularly of its economic policies in a public address in the United States. He didn't suffer while he was in prison though, he had rather privileged existence. It seems to me he used to make critical remarks from inside the prison. He was a very interesting man.

Q. Again in a case like that, the Embassy wouldn't feel any need to intervene?

A. Well yes. In the case of Ebtehaj we did intervene. Ebtehaj had lots of friend in Washington. Now that I think of it, we took quite an active role in trying to obtain his release. Talking the to Shah directly and ...

Q. How would that be done? If you could imagine your sitting there talking to the Shah. What words and phrases would be used? It's interesting for those of us who weren't there. How indirect or how much...

A. Well I wouldn't have said anything because I wasn't dealing with the Shah. It would have to be the Ambassador.

Q. Can you imagine how the Ambassador would have brought such a subject up with the Shah?

A. Well probably on the basis of a message from Washington, under instructions to suggest that Ebtehaj was a person that would value the country that he was widely known internationally, and particularly in the United States, that it did not ... to the credit of the regime to have him in jail for merely expressing personal views in the United States whatever the reason was and that we would hope that it might be found possible to release him. I think he was quite direct. Now that I think of it, I

think that was the only instance that I can recall of our intervening the Shah for an individual Iranian politician. And he was subsequently released and he kept on complaining. It didn't seem to intimidate him at all.

Q. When there was a change of Prime Ministers such as when Amini resigned and then Assadollah Alam was appointed Prime Minister, how and when would the Ambassador find out about it? Would he just hear it over the radio and read it in the newspaper like an average Iranian or would he be informed about it by the Shah or someone prior to the announcement?

A. Well, usually he was informed ahead of time either by the Shah or by the Minister of Court.

Q. Do you recall this particular change?

A. No I can't say, I can't recall the details but usually we knew not long before but two or three days or one day, whatever.

Q. Was there a case where the opinion of the Ambassador was solicited by the Shah during the time you were there?

A. I don't know that it was not. I don't recall that it was. Have you ever considered getting in touch with Ambassador Meyer?

Q. We should.

A. Yes I think you should. The Shah became more approachable during Ambassador Meyer's time in Iran.

Q. Really. Why is that?

A. I don't really know. I think it might be useful for you to talk to Ambassador Meyer.

Q. Is he still living in Washington?

Stuart Rockwell - 2

A. Yes.

Q. Is he still connected with Georgetown?

A. No he's retired from there. He's a consultant for some American Company. He travels frequently to the Middle East. But he, I was only there with him for about three months but I have the impression that possibly during his term in Tehran, the Shah might have asked his opinion about various people. He wouldn't have asked anybody's opinion about Assadollah Alam's who's a friend from way back. And there was no reason why we would have had any opinion about Ghods-Nakhaii, for example.

Q. About who?

A. Ghods-Nakhaii?

Q. Who became Minister of Court.

A. Yes, well wasn't he Prime Minister for a while too.

Q. No.

A. Sharif-Emami was not anybody that we had any particular connection with.

Q. I remember the time, when I first came back to Iran and met Bill Miller. At that time he was so critical of Sharif-Emami. The things he had to say about him really surprised me at the time--an official of the American Embassy was saying things like that publicly.

A. Well, of course Bill Miller was Not everybody was talking like that.

Q. That is unusual. What recollection do you have about the Fifteenth of Khordad uprising that is referring to June riots in 1963?

A. Oh I can remember vividly the circumstances in the sense of the physical effect; the shooting in the streets, the fact that we were confined to the Embassy, were told

Stuart Rockwell - 2

not to go out and the subsequent exile of Khomeini but, we did not attribute to that the importance that the subsequent history shows that should have been attributed to it. In fact we, I think, felt that the Shah deserved credit for taking such strong steps against what seemed to us to be reactionary anti-reform elements. There were of course quite a few deaths in Tehran at that time.

Q. Would you say that the 84 which was officially given was an underestimate?

A. I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know. I don't believe we had any observers on the street. Actually I think there was a feeling that the Shah had been rather magnanimous in exiling Khomeini and not executing him.

Q. It's been said that General Pakravan and Alam had a role in persuading....

A. Could be. I don't know. Pakravan was an interesting man. I think he should be regarded by history as a positive element in a delicate and difficult position, contrary to Bakhtiar was a very ruthless person. What happened to Pakravan? Was he executed?

Q. Yes he was.

A. What is your view of him? Was he....

Q. Well I can tell you that he is one of the few people who worked for the Shah and held a very controversial post who has been remembered very positively by most of the opposition figures we've interviewed. There are only a few people like that who have been supported by both sides of the fence.

A. Yes, I think he was what one would have called a gentleman really and an extraordinarily sensitive person for a military officer in a position like that.

Q. But when a riot like that occurred, didn't the Embassy feel that it had to find out what's going on and who was behind it? It is hard to imagine that you people,

confined in the Embassy, were just sitting around waiting and listening to the radio or waiting to be told by some Iranian official what was happening

A. Well it's not that we weren't informed. It was not difficult to find out what had happened. I mean it was fairly straightforward, the religious elements in the bazaar united to provoke a riot. It was as simple as that. It didn't seem wise as I recall it for foreign officials to be out mingling in the crowd while that was happening.

Q. But did you feel that the intelligence services had done a proper job of forewarning you regarding what was about to happen?

A. No I don't think we had any forewarning as I recall it. I don't think it was generally known that this was going to happen. Certainly the regime seemed to be caught by surprise.

Q. Did you have any discussions afterwards in order to prevent this from happening again: by strengthening the information network and to know more about what was going on underneath?

A. I think that we took the mistaken idea that this was a one shot deal and that it had been nipped in the bud by the reaction and it was the last gasp of the reactionaries.

Q. It's been said that it was really Assadollah Alam who was able to take a strong stand against these riots and that if the Shah had been left on his own, he may not have been able to do that. Is there anything in your experience or your knowledge of the time that would lend support to this theory?

A. My understanding is that that is true. That Alam advised the Shah that he ought to react strongly. That the Shah was vacillating as to what to do. I believe that to be true.

Stuart Rockwell - 2

Q. What do you remember about the organization or formation and the development of the group around Hassan-Ali Mansour. First of all, when did you first meet him? What sort of character was he?

A. Well, I met him as soon as we got there practically because we were living in his house which was rented from him by, actually it belonged to his father. Rented for us by the Embassy. It was the residence of the Minister until the new one was constructed in the compound and Ali Mansour's own house was right next door so we had regular social contact with the Mansour's and as I said last night, it seemed to us that within the context of Iranian political movements and groups that the Iranian people were the most original and independent and out of context younger political representatives. They had the system of dowrehs. They had this group of younger professional types who met regularly to discuss everything under the sun. And I think we had some hope that the selection of Mansour might be a positive, lead to positive developments if the Shah would not interfere with them too much because they were people who were well trained, who seemed well motivated and certainly were not in the mold of the traditional old style Iranian politician-like Eghbal or Sharif-Emami, So we were moderately hopeful that within the restrictions of the situation and the continuing, continuance of royal authority that this government could be refreshingly different. Now that being said, I have to say that I don't think Ali Mansour really realized what he was doing in the sense that he didn't understand the complexities of running a country like Iran. One reason I think that is that we had a running problem with the Iranians over the fact that we wished to have jurisdiction over our military people in U.S. judicial procedures and not have them tried in Iranian courts.

Q. I was going to ask you about that.

Stuart Rockwell - 2

A. You know that perfectly well that the feeling has always been that not only in Iran but in other foreign countries that the system of justice is so different that the possibility of what we would consider unsuitable treatment was very strong. So we tried for a long time to get, particularly the Pentagon was interested in it, a status of forces agreement with Iran which would permit the trial of military personnel accused of crimes against Iranians to be tried in U.S. military courts rather than the Iranian civilian ones.

Q. Does this have precedence in any other country?

A. It's an important, it was an important objective all over the world and in fact we had them in all, as I recall, the NATO countries where we had U.S. forces it was agreed that soldiers would be tried in the U.S. Military Tribunals. It was a standard thing. But we had particular difficulty in getting the Iranian Government, successive Iranian governments to agree. It was not until Ali Mansour became Prime Minister that the Government did agree. And I have a feeling just between you and me that that cost him his life because that was one of the reasons that the traditionalist element objected so strongly that is to say that they felt that Iran had given up part of its sovereignty to a foreign power and that he as the instrumentality of that was responsible. The reason I say that I'm not sure he understood is that I remember perfectly well talking to him about it and saying that you realize under this agreement if an Iranian is killed however, intentionally or accidentally by an American military person, that that American person will not go before an Iranian Tribune. He said, "I didn't realize that."

Q. He hadn't realized that.

A. He hadn't realized that. It led me to conclude that he really hadn't read the text of the proposed agreement. But nonetheless he signed it or somebody in the

Stuart Rockwell - 2

Government signed it and we had it. And my personal view is that that was a major element in his assassination.

Q. Would you say, what degree of pressure was put on him to put this through from the U.S.?

A. Well, only the degree of pressure that we kept asking for it. He knew that we wanted it and I guess that it was decided that it would be useful to oblige us. In retrospect, I think it was wrong for us to press so hard for it because it's not the kind of thing that is understandable in a country like Iran. Or if it's understandable, it's not the kind of thing that's acceptable. And I think in retrospect that the political authorities in Washington should have prevented the Pentagon from pressing so hard on this but it meant a great deal to them largely because of their relationship with the families of the Military personnel and because of very unfortunate experiences in other third world countries where people have been in jail for years without coming to trial or have been given....

Q. I believe a year or two before that there was a U.S. Air Force officer who had been in jail for

A. Yes but he was released I think, but that was the kind of problem that the Military wished to avoid but the casualty of that agreement was the Iranian Prime Minister. That's just a personal view. I don't know that but, and I don't think he realized what he was getting into. He was an interesting man but not a strong one. He was almost a dilettante, more than one would have thought for somebody who was as well educated as he was. Strange person really. And his wife was neurotic, poor woman.

Q. For years she was accusing the Shah for his assassination. I believe there is still talk of that.

A. You mean she thinks the Shah engineered the... but wasn't it some religious fanatic that... it happened after....when did it happen?

Q. '65, I believe.

A. Well, of course, I don't think there's any truth to that at all. The only truth would be that the Shah didn't, the Shah accepted the idea of that agreement.

Q. Again, in some ways, Mansour's relationship with the Shah is seen as being similar to that of Amini. Certain people close to the Shah say that he was not very comfortable with Mansour as a Prime Minister and that perhaps Mansour was a bit more ambitious than the Shah would have liked. And perhaps one reason why he appointed him was because either some United States official may have suggested it or the Shah thought that it may please the Americans if he appoints Mansour. Do you have any comments about that? Basically the relationship between Mansour and the Shah.

A. Yes. I think the problem with Mansour was that he was regarded by the Shah as being possibly too closely connected with what one might have considered to be the liberal element on the political scene.

Q. In Iran?

A. In Iran. Mansour, to my knowledge, was not known to have very profound connections with the United States. He did not have a previous history of assignment there. He was not known personally to high ranking American officials as Amini was and I would have thought that he would not be regarded by the Shah as a degree of potential rivalry or threat that Amini could be. But at the same time, Mansour, although respectful of the Shah, was not of the kowtowing "Oh God" political nature of person, who was accustomed to accept whatever the Shah said

Stuart Rockwell - 2

as being the law of the land. I don't know what event led to the... Was Amini assassinated while he was in office or afterward?

Q. Mansour?

A. I mean Mansour, Mansour.

Q. Mansour was assassinated

A. But was he assassinated while in office?

Q. That's right. He was going to the Parliament.

A. Yes. I don't recall any of the particulars between the Shah and Mansour except that they weren't, it was not possible for them to be close friends in the sense that Alam and the Shah were for example.

Q. Did he have any particular kind of a close relationship with the American Embassy in Tehran aside from having rented his house....

A. No. He was just well known and, no he had no particular relationship other than the fact that he was known to all of us as one of the younger elements on the scene.

Q. Was there any effort made to try to promote him?

A. Not to my recollection.

Q. I think one of the people we interviewed said that when the elections took place there was possibility of Mansour not ending at the top of the list of Tehran and that he had tried to get some help through the American Embassy to make him come out as the top vote getter in Tehran.

A. I don't recall anything.

Q. Does anything like this ring true?

A. No, I don't remember anything like that. I think we would not have been involved in anything like that. It's not the kind of thing that paid off very well. Everything was known in Tehran. If it wasn't known, it was suspected. I've never seen a place where a rumor, where so much importance was given to a rumor. So many patently untrue things were accepted, it's absolutely true.

Q. The appointment of Mansour and his young technocrats to office, seems to be a break point in Iranian history. From then on people who really had no widespread connection with the land or the country, assumed decision making positions; while in the past, with all the problems that existed with the old timers, they had at least grown up in Iran and lived closer to the ordinary people and had a better sense of their various sensibilities. And even though they were very subservient to the Shah they found indirect ways of hinting at things and making suggestions, while this new group was totally different. Do you care to comment on this? Do you see that as a turning point?

A. Well it certainly was a different, the government had a totally different character and one that was very useful because the complexity of the economic and military relationships with the United States became overwhelming and I had to, we had to admit that it was very useful to have in places like the plan organization and the economic ministries, people with a technocratic background who understood the complexities of the economic relationship. There were some very bright people like Khodadad Farmanfarmaian, for example, and that fellow who was the head of the plan organization for such a long time. They understood the problems involved in dealing with a modern and expanding economy and so it was really a very useful kind of a government to have to deal with. And it certainly would have been a departure from the normal kind of old style of political group.

Q. Useful in that they spoke the same language?

A. Yes, one could have a confidence if both sides understood what they were talking about which was not always the case.

Q. There was no concern or recognition that although they spoke the same language as their Western counterparts, perhaps they didn't really speak the same language as the common ordinary Iranian?

A. You know that's interesting to think about. I guess there wasn't any concern over that fact. There was a realization, but it was considered positive rather than a negative element. That you couldn't deal with the kinds of economic undertakings that were being considered without having some understanding of how they operated and what was involved. Whether the country should have been engaging in undertakings of that magnitude and complexity in each stage of development is of course another problem but if it were to do that it was indeed fortunate I believe we thought that a group of young Iranians had come forward or have been put forward who were equipped to deal with.

Q. It seems that Ebtehaj and Amini were two people, that I can think of right now, who spoke both languages. They could speak both to the Western Secretary of the Treasury in the United States and understand each other and at the same time they could go to Qom or Kashan and sit in at some memorial service or some religious festivity and know exactly what to do and what to say.

A. That's right. That's a very good point. I don't think it was the difference that caused us, there was nothing much we could do about it and I'm not sure that anybody worried very much about it. But you know, one of the problems in my view that has always effected Iran is the fact that young people are held to be, it is considered to be improper that a young person should have too much authority. That there has to be respect for older people who have been around a long time and gone through the mill as it were and come to the top so many of these young men

who were educated in England, and the United States and France and Germany came back with, full of ambition and enthusiasm and ran into these older people at the head of ministries who resented their "can do" attitude as a threat to their own authority and I think these young technocrats ran into that kind of problem quite frequently that they were obstructed by jealous older individuals in the bureaucracy who felt they were upstarts and too foreign and a threat to their own internal authority regardless of whether they spoke to the people or not they clashed with the traditionalists in the bureaucracy.

Q. What do you remember about Hoveida, who replaced Mansour?

A. Well Hoveida was another of our neighbors in Tehran. A very interesting man, an excellent sense of humor, thoroughly, it seemed to me at least, sincere, hard working, well educated, not pompous in the slightest, not carried away with the importance of his position, economically well grounded. Somebody who did not appear to be a threat to the Shah at all, and yet who wasn't afraid to speak to the Shah on negative matters and give him council and advice that he might not consider palatable.

Q. Is that true?

A. I think so. At least that was our impression of him. I suppose we got that impression largely from him so it may have been self-serving but that was our impression and of course he did stay on as Prime Minister for years and years. I suppose some would say by toadying to the Shah but I'm not sure that, at least while I was there, that that was the case. I think the Shah found him rather refreshing and no threat in the sense that he didn't have a political base. He didn't represent land owners or clergy or bazaars. He just represented himself really. I take it from what you've said that later on he was considered so interested in his position that he would do a good deal in order to maintain...

Q. Well, this is what his critics say.

A. I don't know that that is true. But then, that was long after I left.

Q. For a time, he and Ardeshir Zahedi were engaged in quite a bit of rivalry.

A. Yes, so I gather largely from what Ardeshir used to say in Washington, very critical of Hoveida, and openly so.

Q. While he was Ambassador he was saying these things?

A. Yes. And while Hoveida was Prime Minister.

Q. What was the basis of his criticism?

A. That Hoveida was interfering, that he undermined Zahedi with the Shah. I never really did know why he disliked him so. I thought it was indiscreet of him to be so critical.

Q. Then again Zahedi was quite effective otherwise in Washington.

A. Zahedi was socially very prominent and considered charming by many Americans. In my view he was a lightweight, he didn't have the kind of influence in the American government that a person of, a representative of a country which was so important to us should have had. In particular, Henry Kissinger did not have respect for his intellectual capacity although he enjoyed very much his social companionship. So Zahedi was a prominent figure on the Washington scene but he was not the kind of Ambassador who was considered to be a serious person in my view.

Q. Which of the Iranian Ambassadors in Washington that you knew would you consider more serious?

A. Well Ali Amini certainly. That's the only one that I can remember that I would consider to be more serious?

Q. Was Ansary ambassador when you were in Washington, Hushang?

A. Yes he was. Hushang Ansary. I think he was considered to be a capable person. He was not particularly well liked but he was, yes I would say he was sincere. I was not in Iran of course because it was much later. But I was in Washington. And Ansary was capable. Certainly, he knew his economic facts very well. He was respected. A devious sort of a person though I think.

Q. He seemed to have some kind of relationship with the Helmses, established while he was in Washington which continued when they were in Iran, they were quite close.

A. Is that so. Well, we knew him largely through his wife who was the daughter of Panahi, but we were not close with Hushang.

Q. I think they knew him the say way, the Helms' also knew him through his mother-in-law.

A. I guess he's an able fellow. He's not the kind of Iran... -- not the person that I particularly care for but that's a personal matter. He was Ambassador at an important time for Iran when things were the interflow of economic and military assistance was very heavy. Anyway, it was a much more capable and better professionally better equipped than Ardeshir Zahedi was. But Zahedi made very much out of what he had. And he used his social charm to very good effect. The Iranian Embassy was one of the most prominent in Washington under his leadership.

Q. I have reached the end of the list of the questions that I had, if there is anything that you wish to add before we close?

A. Well, I'd just like to say that the five years that we passed in Iran were amongst the happiest in our whole diplomatic career, that we thought the country was

absolutely marvelous, that we liked the Iranians, we've more friends among the Iranians than of any representatives of any other country in which we've served, and we've kept up those contacts as the years have gone by. For that reason the tragedy of the Revolution is particularly poignant for us and as I said last night I feel that the Shah has been maligned by many Iranians who probably now wish that he were there rather than this present regime, because whatever his faults may have been, the Shah I think was seriously dedicated to creating Iran as a modern state in the European sense. He felt that the only way to achieve this was given the nature of the Iranians and the political system was through the guidance of an enlightened monarch, and he was not prepared to concede that Iranians could manage their own affairs in a democratic manner, given the degree of political education and experience and discipline which he conceived of them as having, and of course this led to these major problems with the Iranian intelligentsia, and the second problem was the ruthlessness of the security forces which became increasingly brutal in the treatment of anybody who even professed the mildest of so called, what one would consider liberal views particularly during the later years. The tragedy of the Shah I think was that he failed to recognize that he was pushing too hard against a traditionalist society which resented his introduction of too much Western influence into a country which was of a different culture and also that the effects of the Revolution and the increasing Iranian prosperity raised expectations amongst Iranians which could not be fulfilled despite the seeming wealth of the nation. What the Shah could have done to save his regime at the end, I do not know and I think that history will show that one reason that things deteriorated so rapidly was that the Shah lost his own sense of direction and control largely I suppose because of the fatal illness under which he was suffering, but I believe in the end history will record that the Shah's role in Iran during the period from 1960-75 was

in the interest of the country a beneficial one rather than a totally negative one. And I guess that's all I have to say.

Q. You mentioned something yesterday that I forgot to ask you, and I think it's interesting to have down -- that is the comparison between the two kings [where you represent[ed] your country: King Hassan and Mohammad Reza Shah. What were the similarities and differences between their style of Kingship?

A. Well of course, the similarities are that they are both a one-man situation, that there's an authoritarian monarchy, and that no decision is of any importance and too many decisions of unimportance are taken by one man. Of course the two countries are very dissimilar in the sense that although they are both Islamic one is Sunni the other is Shia and that Morocco is much smaller and less wealthy than Iran. It doesn't have the oil and it does not, at least when I was there, it did not have the proportionate amount of intelligentsia and educated middle class people although that's changing very rapidly in Morocco. I guess the major difference is that King Hassan has managed and very carefully maintained a very strong connection with the traditionalist element in his country. He is the leader of the faithful as well as the chief of State, although of course the Shah is considered himself also to be that. Nonetheless, the King has been careful not to break with the tribal chieftains with the religious element. He still today maintains a harem of women from various politically important segments of the country so that they feel represented in the Capitol and in the Palace. And another difference between the two is that Morocco has long been under foreign influence, particularly French. So there is a, the Western presence in Morocco is not, while it is perhaps not appreciated so much by the traditionalist element, is not a bone of contention. It has been said that Morocco is half the old testament and half Hollywood. In that sense it is much more sophisticated than Iran was at the time when I was there.

And the degree of Western influence in Morocco is accepted as part of the Moroccan tradition almost, since it has not been independent for the many many years that Iran has been. So although Hassan does have some of the same, his regime has some of the same characteristics in them, it's a monarchy and it's a one man situation and the Palace interferes with the democrat... political process of the country. And there is discontent in the cities, and the intelligentsia is unhappy with the monarchy. Nonetheless, I think it's safe to say, and it certainly was when I was there, that the majority of the Moroccans expect to have a King and they expect the King to behave as a King, to have palaces and to have a harem, and to live in splendor, and to be treated with reverence. And all they ask of him is that he conduct himself in a suitable fashion. And it was when he was perceived that he was not doing so that two attempts were made against his regime on the basis of corruption and improper dealings with foreign contractors and the like. But as long, until things change markedly in Morocco as long as the King doesn't overstep the bounds of what is perceived to be the proper role for the Chief of State, he will not be in the kind of danger that the Shah got himself into by pushing too hard against the traditionalist element and by using, and by suffering from the results of the great infusion of wealth that came into the country and raised so many expectations. Morocco doesn't have that.

Q. Can you compare their personalities? Were there any similarities?

A. They're quite, in a way they're quite similar I think, although coming from very different backgrounds and nationalities. They are both extremely well educated. They are smart, intelligent and courageous. I would say they were both, the Shah and the King of Morocco, are rather, well, judged from a Western point of view they are rather wily people. They perhaps even could be said to be untrustworthy in the sense of not living up to committed agreements because of the subsequent

Stuart Rockwell - 2

development of events, particularly in the case of King Hassan whose regime is known for being very unreliable as far as contracts are concerned and the spoken word and all that kind of thing. But there's no doubt that there are similarities in that both of them I think were working and are working for the good of their country as they see it.

Q. What about self-confidence and self-assurance?

A. Well, King Hassan I don't think has never suffered from the kind of insecurity that I understand the Shah..... <End of tape.>